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Purpose: In the conventional international health and safety policy design, the decision makers rarely think in terms 
of business models. As an example, the yellow paper-based vaccination certificates, initiated and implemented by 
the WHO in 1969, have not changed very much since then. In 2020, the Covid-19 crisis accelerated innovation, partic-
ularly digitalisation, in many sectors, and the sense of urgency to have a digital immunisation certificate was voiced 
by many governments, as well as corporations. The new solution must enable international interoperability, but it is 
a challenging task because the setup of health registries varies across countries and because the common actions 
have been hindered due to the lack of trust – the trust deficit.
Approach: In this article, the case is discussed in the platform business model framework, and the role of trust 
in gaining competitive advantage – the trust advantage – in its fast and widespread adoption is particularly exem-
plified. The case was analysed in parallel with the discussions and actual development, not ex post, as common in 
business model literature.
Findings: The solution that could be capable of overcoming the privacy and security concerns that have been brought 
up in the international discourse can be described as a decentralised multisided platform, which has a distributed 
management system. The platform’s standardisation would ease its global uptake, and the strategic partnerships with 
countries, organisations, and firms that are already considered trustworthy (possess trust credit) will have the oppor-
tunity to gain trust advantage.
Limitations: This paper was written having the managerial perspective in mind, hence, it does not go deeply into 
all technical and legal aspects affecting the implementation of the digital vaccination certificate platform. It was 
written in parallel with the vivid disputes in the international arena. By the time this article was finished, the first 
pilots had just taken off and it was not clear yet which of the technical solutions and business models will eventually 
become dominant.
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Introduction
Platform-based business models are emerging at 
a fast pace. So far, they have been successfully es-
tablished in many sectors in order to communicate, 
co-innovate, exchange data, goods and services. 
However, in health-related sectors their diffusion has 
been lagging behind, and one of the main reasons 
for this could be the trust-intensive nature of health 
data. The overall increase of trust deficit in society 
has hindered it even further. It should be emphasised 
in the beginning that this article does not address the 
trust towards a vaccine per se, but towards a plat-
form-based ecosystem that is handling health data 
– the individual’s vaccination records. The setup and 
operation of this ecosystem are addressed from the 
platform-based business model perspective.
This case study focuses on the development of a 
multisided platform that enables sharing information 
about the individual’s vaccination status1. In this ar-
ticle, the ‘platform’ is defined as a nexus of rules and 
infrastructure that facilitate interactions among net-
work users (Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne, 2011), 
and in this case offering value as a central interoper-
ability service. In the public discourse the vaccina-
tion certificate has synonyms, e.g. green certificate2, 
immunity passport, etc., but as it is not an official 
travel document, the word ‘passport’ is misleading. 
For the new platform to be able to replace the yellow 
paper-based vaccination certificates3, initiated by 
the WHO and implemented by individual countries in 
1969, a commonly accepted global digital approach 
is needed. As times of uncertainty may provide new 
opportunities for business model innovation (Aagaard 
and Nielsen, 2021), the Covid-19 pandemic could be a 
much-needed trigger here.
1  Although traditionally the immunity certificates have been 
used for verification that the individual has received a vaccine, 
the same data exchange platform can also be used for verifica-
tion of the existence of antibodies, or that the person has 
tested negative a few days before the travel.
2  EU Green Certificate [https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-
travel-eu/coronavirus-response/safe-covid-19-vaccines-eu-
ropeans/covid-19-digital-green-certificates_en], and several 
similar regional and national initiatives.
3  International certificate of vaccination or prophylaxis [https://
www.who.int/ihr/ports_airports/icvp/en/]
In order to gain ground, the management (orches-
tration) of the platform is crucial, as its successful 
implementation will require a critical mass of us-
ers. The tactical steps should therefore consider the 
platform development phase and respective criti-
cal success factors (Trischler, Meier, and Trabucchi, 
2021). To take off, the users and all other stakehold-
ers need to have trust towards the platform leader, 
each other, and the technology. The trust in the 
whole platform may still be vulnerable to psychologi-
cal manipulations, even if the technology behind it is 
proven to be secure. This has given a reason to say 
that a new form of trust is needed (Werbach, 2018), 
and this article aims to contribute to building this 
knowledge stream.
The extant literature predominantly addresses the 
trust between individuals or the trust between firms 
(see also the review by Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012), 
but these streams have not been well interlinked. 
There are fewer studies about how individuals trust 
companies, or more specifically, discussing trust 
towards different types of business models. As the 
trust has been used to explain human choice (Miller, 
1992), it could be claimed, of course, that partly it is 
covered in marketing studies. However, there it is 
also usually addressed indirectly.
From the literature, it can be summarised that the 
precondition for trust to be meaningful rises from 
risk, which further comes from interdependence 
(Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer, 1998). The 
actual or cognitive risks can be associated with 
change, the deviation from the status quo, which 
in the case of the digital vaccination certificate are 
exemplified in Table 1. The perceived interdepend-
ence-related risks come from digitalisation, data 
storage and transfer, particularly from sharing the 
responsibility of ensuring security and transparency 
in this process. However, objectively the distributed 
ledger technology (DLT) and decentralised manage-
ment can actually reduce risks.
In the platform business model, interdependence is 
unavoidable, moreover, it is actually an enabler of 
the main source of its competitive advantage over 
traditional two-sided business models – the network 
effects. However, it is a business model design and 
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implementation challenge where the relationships 
between stakeholders are quite complex, and moti-
vations often intertwined.
So far, the literature (Parker and Van Alstyne, 2018; 
McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017; de Reuver, Sørensen, 
and Bahole, 2018) addresses mainly platform-based 
interactions where the platform sides are either 
firms or individuals, leaving the role of govern-
ments and intergovernmental organisations aside. 
Although the individuals, ICT companies, vaccina-
tion clinics and large pharma companies are all part 
of this extended ecosystem, the market uptake and 
diffusion of the interoperable digital vaccine certi-
fication platform depends first on governments and 
intergovernmental agreements (including global 
intergovernmental organisations). Of particular im-
portance is their ability to reduce perceived risks, 
and enable trust to be built and sustained, which is 
crucial for the emergence of network effects.
If implemented, the digital platform can replace 
the current yellow printed vaccination booklets on 
borders, as well as ease domestic travel, access to 
campuses, large events and corporate buildings. In 
the long term, the underlying DLT and its multisided 
platform business model creates even more e-gov-
ernance opportunities.
In this article, the case was addressed at the meta-
model level (Massa, Tucci, and Afuah, 2017), and is 
based on interviews with the visionary and technical 
people behind it. The data collection as well as the 
theory building followed the principles of grounded 
theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1994), and the research-
er was interacting with the platform’s team during its 
development.
The article is set up so that the description of the 
development of a case is intertwined with relevant 
theoretical standpoints, especially from the rich 
literature on the phenomenon of trust, and lessons 
from commercial platform business models. It starts 
with explaining the essence of a multisided platform 
business model and continues by discussing the 
different facets of trust. Thereafter, these streams 
merge to bring out the importance of trust – the 
trust advantage – for the success of a platform.
Background of the Digital  
Vaccination Certificate Platform
The writing up of this case study occurred in paral-
lel with its implementation endeavours, not ex post, 
as is common in business model literature. The de-
velopment of the digital vaccination certificate plat-
form started in 2019 (i.e. pre-Covid-19) as one of the 
sub-projects of the Estonian X-Road platform4. The 
idea came from the Nordic Institute of Interoper-
ability Solutions and was promptly picked up by the 
Estonian government strategy office. The WHO5 also 
acknowledged the need, which gave a boost to the 
IT developers in Estonia and Finland who initially 
took up the challenge as a non-for-profit side-task. 
However, the most critical aspect, the approach for 
bringing it to actual use (Gawer and Cusumano, 2008) 
with all of its possibilities, was not so clear at the 
beginning. The term ‘approach’ is used consciously 
because people making international health policy 
agreements usually do not use business model ter-
minology or think in the platform business model 
framework.
As the first contributors were predominantly ICT 
firms, many with extensive experience, then techni-
cally there was probably quite a good understanding 
of what the critical features of the solution could 
be – interoperability, personal data protection, time 
stamping, etc. However, it is known that inferior 
technical properties can be overplayed by a superior 
business model (Amit and Zott, 2015), so the latter 
required thorough attention as well.
The aim was no less than to create a global standard 
for exchanging data about an individual’s vaccina-
tion status, where the international interoperabil-
ity is based on a distributed data governance model 
and decentralised management. The key principle 
and guidance for developers was “the simpler, the 
better”. The envisioned approach would fall under a 
platform architecture logic, although so far the plat-
forms have been used, as well as addressed in the 
literature, primarily in the business context.
4  Nordic Institute for Interoperability Solutions [https://x-road.
global/]
5 World Health Organization [https://www.who.int]
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Table 1.
Paper-based yellow vaccination certificate Digital vaccination certificate platform with de-
centralised management and based on distributed 
ledger technology
Both contain entries about every vaccination event (injection made by whom, where and when, often ac-
companied with vaccine name and batch number).
Entries (and vaccine injections) are made by qualified personnel in accredited clinics.
Requires presenting an official travel ID (passport) to match the person with the vaccination records.
The border officer can browse the whole paper-
based vaccination certificate.
Only the necessary data can be made visible, i.e. if  
a border officer should check for Covid-19, then 
only relevant data can be made visible.
An individual covers the costs of issuing the blank 
paper-based vaccination certificate.
An individual may cover the costs of keeping the 
digital ledger, but it may be also covered in full by 
the government. The financial model still needs to 
be agreed upon and can differ across countries.
Can get lost. Cannot get lost.
Not tamper-proof. Signature, stamp, batch sticker 
rather easy to replicate.
Tamper-proof. Timestamped, irreversible, and 
encrypted data entry and transmission.
Paper-based records can be duplicated in the 
national electronic health registry and then they 
are also remotely accessible to doctors in the same 
country. 
Enables international interoperability and com-
munication between national IT systems, acces-
sible abroad and valid in all participating countries 
around the world.
Needed for travelling to a limited number of  
countries, mainly in Africa and Asia.
Since 2020 Covid-19 pandemic affects all travellers 
around the world.
Table 1: Similarities and differences between the digital vaccination certificate platform and the established paper-based yellow 
vaccination certificate
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The Platform Setup
The setup took advantage of the participating ICT 
companies’ existing competences in blockchain and 
similar DLTs, which enable features that would not 
have been possible even a decade ago. There is no 
need for a central global database that could be a tar-
get for a cyber-attack. Instead, during the check for 
vaccination status the inspector makes inquiries to 
the platform, which further communicates with the 
national databases that keep the records made by 
the nationally certified vaccination clinics (Figure 1). 
Hence, the primary role of the digital vaccination cer-
tificate platform is to be a transaction platform, where 
data is the transaction object. For quick and wide 
diffusion it is important that no specific hardware 
or software should be needed to check the vaccina-
tion status. Therefore, the identifier, a QR or barcode, 
which is unique for each injection or vaccine dose, 
should be readable even with a mobile phone scanner.
The setup is based on the open technological standard 
and standardised, default contracts, which have been 
considered as essential elements of the platform busi-
ness model (Parker and Van Alstyne, 2018; Eisenmann, 
Parker, and Van Alstyne, 2009) and a cornerstone of 
its competitive advantage. The paradox of openness 
(Schmeiss, Hoelzle, and Tech, 2019) has been consid-
ered as one of the main challenges in setting up the 
platform ecosystem – finding the right balance be-
tween openness and control for maximising value 
to all members. In the case of the digital vaccination 
certificate, the platform would be eventually open to 
all countries. However, a smaller group would be used 
for the first piloting round. Similarly, it would be usable 
to all individuals residing in, or travelling to and from, 
these countries. Similarly, the platform should be open 
to all vaccination clinics that are certified and as of to-
day working with paper-based certificates.
The openness does not reduce the value here in any 
way, in fact, it increases it. The 2nd level comple-
mentors, e.g. other ICT firms that wish to build their 
applications on the same platform later on, should 
be required to fulfil some credibility criteria, in or-
der not to compromise the trust towards the whole 
ecosystem. Therefore, it could be said that the digi-
tal vaccination certificate is a semi-open platform, 
i.e. the platform leader retains control over who can 
become a complementor.
In the business context, the platform technology and 
created data are usually proprietary (Teece, 2017), and 
the platform leader prefers to keep control over it, to 
be able to ensure that the trust towards the platform 
is not abused. In the case of the digital vaccination 
certificate platform, there is no creation of propri-
etary data that could cause ownership disputes be-
tween the platform ecosystem participants or be an 
obstacle for any country joining the system. In legal 
terms, the individual remains the owner of the data, 
and the national regulations of its use will prevail.
Forming the Ecosystem
Following the nested hierarchies of systems, as sug-
gested by Massa, Viscusi, and Tucci (2018), compared 
to the business model of a single firm, the platforms 















Figure 1. Inquiries and data flows on the digital vaccination certificate platform
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stakeholders of a platform altogether form an ecosys-
tem, in which they ideally would be complementors – 
covering all the crucial competences and resources. 
The platform typically has a single leader (sometimes 
referred to as an orchestrator), who is responsible for 
the governance of the platform ecosystem (Wareham, 
Fox, and Giner, 2014). The governance comprises 
mainly execution and secure record-keeping of the 
transactions, and their validation. It encompasses 
setting rules, the control mechanisms that would act 
as a deterrent from opportunism (Rousseau et al., 
1998), and creating the incentives that would keep all 
parties motivated. The appropriateness of the incen-
tives is crucial for the fast emergence of network ef-
fects (Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu, 2013).
In the case of the digital vaccination certificate 
platform, during the launch the leader’s role was 
distributed among the participating organisations, 
mainly visionary incumbent ICT firms, and untypi-
cally, an important role was played by the Estonian 
government (Figure 2). In this platform, two groups 
of end-users interact with each other – the national 
border-crossing unit officials and the individuals 
who need to travel abroad. The complementors, 
who build their products and services to be offered 
via this platform, are no less important. Some of the 
complementors can be essential for the platform 
to exist, and some more ‘complementary’, provid-
ing convenience features. In this case, the essential 
complementors would be the vaccination clinics. In 
business model terms, this leads to a service-ser-
vice bundle value proposition, as giving the vaccine 
is the first service, and keeping a verifiable record 
of the vaccination data is the accompanying ser-
vice. The second wave of complementors could in-
clude ICT firms with various foci – in principle the 
open standard would allow building any kind of new 
e-governance solutions on it.
For the platform to exist and run smoothly, system 
integrators (external service providers) might also 
be necessary. These are the ICT support companies 
that help to install (if necessary) and provide training 
for the platform users or complementors, e.g. border 
guards or vaccination doctors.
Even when the core ecosystem members are in place, 
the selection of additional external partners can be 
critical as well. They can be particularly valuable in 
creating trust towards the platform, as we will explain 
in the next sections with an example of the role of the 
WHO in launching the certification systems.
Creating Trust Towards the Platform
Trust is a phenomenon that has been described as 
an antecedent, outcome or moderator (McEvily, 
Perrone, and Zaheer, 2003). Among the many con-
ceptualisations of trust that can be found across 
Government of the country 
that the individual enters 
PLATFORM LEADER 
Shared role between the Government of Estonia and 
incumbent ICT companies in Estonia and Finland 
Government of the country 
that the individual leaves 
Homeland security of the country 
that the individual enters 
Public health authority of the country 
that the individual leaves 
2nd level USER: 
the guard on the border 
1st level USER: 
the travelling individual 
COMPLEMENTOR 
an accredited  
vaccination clinic 




World Health Organization (WHO) 
Inquiry on the 
platform/ 
validation 
Figure 2: The ecosystem of the digital vaccination certificate platform
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disciplines, it has been attributed to the trustor’s be-
lief in the trustee’s ‘ability’ (Mayer, Davis, and Schoor-
man, 1995; Sitkin and Roth, 1993), ‘capability’ (Jaatun, 
Pearson, Gittler, Leenes, and Niezen, 2020), ‘exper-
tise’ (Parmigiani and Mitchell, 2005), or ‘competence’ 
(David and McDaniel, 2004) on the one hand, and ‘will-
ingness’ (Jaatun et al., 2020) on the other. Although 
with slight differences to the original works, in this 
study the first four of the above terms can be con-
sidered as synonyms, and from here on in the term 
‘ability’ will be used. Furthermore, if we consider the 
ability to be domain-specific (Sitkin and Roth, 1993), 
we could reason that so is the trust (Zand, 1972). The 
willingness has also been related to (avoiding) op-
portunistic behaviour (Rousseau et al., 1998), which 
is likely a more general personality trait (not as much 
domain-specific as the ability).
Although the digital vaccination certificate platform 
falls into the broader health sector, which per se en-
compasses high requirements for trust, here it is 
discussed mainly from the perspective of managing 
personal data. As the impeachment of trust in the 
case of this platform is not as fatal as could potentially 
be in the case of some other health-related technolo-
gies, the concern about trust is perhaps more related 
to personal data protection in general. In the increas-
ingly digitalised world, where the concern over pri-
vacy can be felt with every new ICT application, the 
concern related to the processing of personal data is 
a serious trust barrier in the diffusion of innovations.
This is exactly where the value of the technical ar-
chitecture of the DLTs comes to the picture – pro-
viding transparent, irreversible and encrypted data 
transmission technology and standardised con-
tracts, which are not dependant on cultural context. 
The ability to provide this universal value constitutes 
the technical part of its trust advantage (competi-
tive advantage resulting from being trustworthy).
Already today the vaccination clinics that fill in the 
yellow paper-based certificates need to be accredit-
ed, and often this information is also stored digitally 
in a national health system. Hence, it could be said 
that the individuals who are using it have at least 
some trust towards their own government’s ability 
to handle this. In the case of the digital vaccination 
certificate platform, it will be leveraged with the 
need to trust personal data processing, storage and 
transfer across borders and cultures. We need to be 
aware that the technological awareness and accept-
ance of digitalisation is not equally high everywhere, 
and it differs also between cohorts in a country. Yet, 
for maximising the value this innovation can create, 
it is crucial to get the majority of the countries and 
their accredited clinics aboard.
As emphasised earlier, the success of a platform 
business model depends on its ability to create net-
work effects. This ability, as argued below, further 
depends on the ability of the platform and its leader 
to create trust. The experience from commercial 
platform business models suggests that incumbents 
can leverage their existing reputation to jump-start 
their platform (Fuentelsaz, Garrido, and Maicas, 2015; 
Eisenmann et al., 2011). Similarly, Estonia’s reputation 
as a small agile country with a pro-innovation mindset 
was a good starting point for initiating this project. 
This kind of ‘trustworthiness’ advantage can hardly be 
copied by a single firm, especially a newcomer.
In many sectors, the requirement for trustworthi-
ness is much lower for complementors, when com-
pared to the platform leader. However, in this case it 
is not, as everyone wants to be sure that they get the 
right vaccine, in the right dosage, that it has been 
kept in proper conditions prior to the injection, etc. 
This can be achieved by accrediting the clinics and 
their doctors (the complementors), and it is done by 
a government authority.
The trust towards a nascent platform can also be in-
creased by the careful inclusion of external partners 
and strategic allies. The selection of partners is an 
important strategic decision (Zott, Amit, and Massa, 
2011), and their role is usually connected to scaling 
the platform for faster emergence of network ef-
fects. This role can be dedicated to them due to the 
possession of some specific technical capabilities, 
infrastructure, etc., or also coming from intangible 
assets, e.g. previous experience, reputation, includ-
ing earned trust. In the case of the digital vaccina-
tion certificate platform, the impact of the WHO as 
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a strategic partner6 cannot be overemphasised. The 
value certainly comes from the WHO’s international 
network, its information dissemination channels, 
etc., but likely most importantly from having the glob-
al and cross-cultural reputation of being trustworthy.
Formation of Trust in the Case  
of The Digital Vaccination  
Certificate Platform
A path for forming trust might not be straightforward 
for a nascent platform. In this particular case, the op-
portunity-risk ratio is first evaluated by the govern-
ments (arrow 1 in Figure 3), and if a government has 
decided to join the platform, only thereafter can it be 
used by individuals (arrow 2). As a feedback loop, the 
governments usually consider public opinion in mak-
ing their decisions (arrow 4), and the public opinion 
about the new solution includes the perceived risk. 
This perceived risk in the public opinion depends 
also on whether the individuals trust the platform 
leader (arrow 3), first that their data will always be 
available when needed, and second, that it will not 
be misused. The latter is likely the biggest hurdle for 
large technology companies to become leaders of 
such platforms, as the cases of personal data mis-
use are vividly in people’s memory.
6 On October 5th, 2020, the Estonian government signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the WHO [https://
news.err.ee/1143517/estonia-and-world-health-organization-
digitally-sign-cooperation-agreement]
In some cultural contexts, the individual’s trust can 
also form through government in that if people have 
high trust in their own government, then they believe 
that the government makes good choices on their 
behalf. They do not feel the need to dive into techni-
cal details by themselves, and in a way this discharg-
es individuals from direct liability in the case any of 
the risks are realised. One way or another, once the 
triangulation for this decision has reached a positive 
conclusion, it will be quite hard to turn it back, i.e. in 
a way they become dependent on it.
In parallel, the platform leader needs to trust the 
governments, who need to trust the vaccination 
clinics and personnel in their country. For the lat-
ter, the governments have set up registries, stand-
ards, and accreditation systems that are effective 
also today with the paper-based system. As also 
today, the governments need to trust that all other 
governments have done the same (i.e. intergovern-
mental trust). In this case, the trust is connected 
to validation of the actual vaccination procedure 
and its matching entry in the national database. If 
this is in place in all participating countries, and 
the other governments trust the platform leader 
and technology developer, then they can trust the 
whole platform as well. The case of the digital vac-
cination certificate platform is distinctive, in that 
the platform leader’s role has been shared among 
the technology developers and the government of 
the developing and piloting country, i.e. this gov-








Figure 3: The path for forming trust towards a nascent vaccination certificate platform
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The Nexus of Risk and Trust in  
a Platform Business Model, and its 
Effect on The Emergence of  
Network Effects
In explaining the nexus of risk and trust, scholars 
have used various terms, which allow us to also ex-
plain the risk in the context of a platform business 
model. These include, for example, the “perceived 
probabilities” (Bhattacharya, Devinney, and Pillutla, 
1998) about failing or succeeding, or lack of “confi-
dence” (Das and Teng, 1998) that the platform can de-
liver what it promises. Higher trust means that the 
perceived likelihood of positive outcomes is higher 
than of the negative outcomes (Figure 4), or that the 
potential benefits outweigh the risks.
In the case of the digital vaccination certificate plat-
form, the perceived probability of succeeding to 
provide expected value to all ecosystem members 
is directly related to the perceived ability to cre-
ate network effects (McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017). 
However, as discussed before, the ability to create 
network effects depends on the platform leader’s 
ability to form a strong platform ecosystem (includ-
ing complementors and external partners) and man-
age (orchestrate) its operations.
The economics behind the platform’s value crea-
tion is grounded in marginal utility theory, known 
from the neoclassical roots of microeconomics (see 
the works of Jevons, Menger, and Walras in the 19th 
century). For the platform to take off, the direct net-
work effect coming from maximising the participat-
ing countries is most important. This would further 
result in maximising complying border-crossing 
points and accredited vaccination clinics. At the 
same time, the number of individual travellers using 
digital vaccination certificates would be maximised.
However, for the platform to become sustainable 
and competitive in the long term, the indirect net-
work effect that should come from a variety of com-
plements and complementors is equally important 
(McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017). If we assume that 
the first core service would be based on the Covid-19 
vaccination, then access to certain public places (i.e. 
beyond border crossing) could be considered the 
first complement, as would be the vaccinations for 
other diseases. Furthermore, the ICT firms provid-
ing other e-governance solutions based on the same 
platform, using the same standard for interoperabil-
ity, could become complementors as well. Hence, 
the indirect effect resonates with the possibility to 
extend the platform, to use it for many more health-




Data privacy and security issues 
Strong network effects 
Increased convenience and transparency 
Lock-ins and possible switching costs in the future 
perceived RISK related to the truste’s is ABILITY and WILLINGNESS to: 
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Figure 4: The nexus of risk and trust
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health sector as a global e-governance standard. 
Ideally, both the direct and indirect network effects 
would emerge quickly and be strong in nature.
An increasingly important source of indirect net-
work effect is also the data itself that accumulates 
during the platform operations and can provide valu-
able learning opportunities over time. The gathered 
data can be used to further improve the platform 
technology and offered service, and access to the 
data can be alluring to even more complementors, 
further strengthening the network effects. However, 
if this value creation mechanism that is very com-
mon in commercial platforms starts to threaten the 
formation of trust, then in this particular case this 
optional functionality should be dismissed.
These network effects do not emerge just by them-
selves. As usual with the platform business models, 
the initiator and platform leader need to solve the 
common ‘chicken and egg’ problem. Therefore, at 
the launch of a platform, the incentives are set to 
speed up the process, which is often achieved by 
subsidising (at least) one of the platform ecosys-
tem members (Rochet and Tirole, 2006; Parker and 
Van Alstyne, 2005). This is needed until the platform 
reaches a critical mass of users, and the network 
effects become self-enforcing. Thereafter, when 
strong network effects have emerged, the platform 
can be quickly scaled up, and a sustainable incen-
tives system is established. In the case of the digital 
vaccination certificate platform, similar effects can 
be achieved when countries with a common interest 
collaborate (e.g. the decision of the European Com-
mission on 17.03.20217).
The lack of trust (or low trust) may mean, in the 
worst case, that no agreement on collaboration will 
be achieved. But it may also be that because of ur-
gent and severe needs the platform ecosystem will 
be formed, but the constantly emerging privacy and 
security issues do not allow it to achieve its full po-
tential. Among the outcomes of joining a platform 




are also lock-in situations, which at first sight are 
positive from the platform orchestrator’s view, but 
seem negative from a country’s perspective. These 
may include, for example, technical lock-in, non-
technical lock-in (e.g. habits), and possible switching 
costs. However, when looking deeper into the multi-
sided platform business model value creation logic, 
it becomes apparent that all platform participants 
together benefit when everybody is locked in – the 
network effects are sustained.
The Different Facets of Trust, and 
their Dynamics
Across the disciplines, it can be observed that the 
(transaction cost) economists view trust as a cause 
of reduced opportunism among transacting parties, 
which results in lower transaction costs (Williamson, 
1975), whereas organisational science suggests that 
the trust enables cooperative behaviour (Gambetta, 
1988) and promotes adaptive organisational forms, 
such as network relations (Miles and Snow, 1992). 
Game theorists suggest that over time cooperative 
behaviour develops trust (Axelrod, 1984), i.e. empha-
sising its relative and dynamic nature, and bringing 
in the importance of the context when investigating 
the true functioning of trust (Rousseau et al., 1998). 
Indeed, trust can be viewed in several contextual 
boundaries – economic, technological, cultural, etc. 
Moreover, the trust depends on the stakes involved, 
the balance of power in the relationship, and the al-
ternatives available to the trustor (Mayer et al., 1995). 
The interorganisational and interpersonal trust are 
different (Zaheer et al., 1998; Fulmer and Gelfand, 
2012), and this raises many challenges for building 
trust around a digital service like the platform-based 
certification of vaccinations.
From the rich extant literature stream, it is known 
that the phenomenon of trust can have many facets 
and levels (Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). The trust can 
differ in the bandwidth (Sitkin and Roth, 1993; Rous-
seau et al., 1998), where a narrow bandwidth refers to 
a specific trustee’s ability, while a broad bandwidth 
may cover trust towards the trustee’s general execu-
tion ability across disciplines or functions. It is pos-
sible (and likely) that across disciplines the trust is 
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not consistent (Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies, 1998).
Rousseau et al. (1998) highlight the three basic forms 
of trust – calculus-based or calculative, relational, 
and institutional trust. These forms are present in all 
relationships, but their importance and role change 
over time. Deterrence is not usually considered as 
a form of trust, however, it certainly affects diffu-
sion processes, and is sometimes mixed up with the 
utilitarian considerations of calculative trust. In the 
case of the digital vaccination certificate platform, 
the deterrence is backed by the underlying DLT. The 
main forms of trust and the sources of their formula-
tion in the case of the digital vaccination certificate 
platform are shown in Figure 5.
The case where the trustor and the trustee are both 
individuals was evolutionally likely the first one. In this 
case, interpersonal trust matters first-hand through 
its institutionalising effects on interorganisational 
trust (Zaheer et al., 1998), as individuals are viewed 
as representatives of their organisations or nations. 
Once the interpersonal trust has been achieved and 
well maintained, the start of any new collaborative 
project between these individuals (but also their or-
ganisations) can benefit from trust credit.
The relational trust emerges from previous expe-
riences of cooperation. As this form of trust also 
depends on the cultural context, it has varying im-
portance across the world (Dyer and Chu, 2003). 
It requires time and consistency, and therefore it 
is difficult to imitate and substitute (Barney, 1991) 
by competitors, and provides a potential source 
of sustained competitive advantage (Porter and 
Siggelkow, 2008). In the case of the vaccination 
certificate, the relational trust can build on the 
leading firms’ and countries’ previous track record 
in developing and managing reliable e-governance 
solutions, which by now have also been adopted by 
several other countries.
Calculative trust is based on rational choice. The 
quality of the choice further depends on the avail-
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Figure 5: The forms and sources of formulation of trust
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which is rarely the case in practice. Even if it were, it 
has been shown in behavioural economics (e.g. Ari-
ely, 2008) that it would not necessarily be sufficient 
to predict the decisions and actions. It could be as-
sumed that in the increasingly digitalised world one 
day the yellow paper booklets would have been re-
placed anyway because of their inherent inefficien-
cy. But in the case of the vaccination certificate, one 
of the accelerators is clearly the sense of urgency 
created by the Covid-19 pandemic, and this feeds 
directly to the context where the rational choice is 
made. Although difficult to quantify precisely, it is 
clear that every day of delay with the decision and 
action will have a cost on the economy and society at 
large. The decision needs to be made promptly, and 
the partners who have a track record proving their 
ability to execute urgently will have an advantage. 
In economic transactions, the choice comes down 
to costs and benefits, and those who can provide a 
successful pilot or at least a working prototype pro 
bono could get an initial advantage. If wisely man-
aged, this initial advantage can be developed into a 
sustainable competitive advantage.
The institutional trust can be built on the trust credit 
of the countries participating in the pilot project if 
these countries have experience in launching na-
tionwide digital solutions. Despite the actual de-
velopers being ICT firms, the governments’ role in 
promoting and sponsoring the initiative during the 
platform birth phase is crucial. Similarly, the role of 
the WHO as a strategic partner should not be under-
valued, not only because it is a global non-govern-
mental organisation, and therefore reduces the risk 
of opportunistic behaviour, but primarily because 
the WHO itself would be directly affected by ‘can-
nibalism’. The WHO can affect the speed of change 
from both sides – how quickly the digital vaccination 
certificate platform is adopted, as well as how quick-
ly the old paper-based yellow booklet phases out (is 
cannibalised). 
It has been suggested that during the trust formula-
tion process the share of calculative trust decreases 
and the share of relational trust increases, and that 
the role of institutional trust changes little through-
out the trust development (Rousseau et al., 1998). 
This change comes over time from accumulating 
collaboration experience. In their reasoning, build-
ing the trust starts from a blank page, i.e. they do not 
take into account the possibility to use trust credit.
In the case of the vaccination certificate, during 
the platform birth phase, trust credit can be a valu-
able resource for having a head start over the com-
petition. The involvement of governments and ICT 
firms, which have a track record in e-governance 
solutions, confirms the domain-specific capabilities 
and expertise. These domain-specific capabilities 
do not cover only the technology, but also capabili-
ties of orchestrating the whole ecosystem, includ-
ing effectively managing any incurring challenges, 
and designing a business model that is financially 
sustainable, providing value to all platform sides. 
The strategic partnerships (e.g. the WHO) provide 
further trust credit about the achievability of global 
diffusion. It is reasonable to assume that as long the 
platform management (orchestration) structure re-
mains stable, the institutional trust does not change 
much as well.
In the later phases, the initial trust credit needs to 
be justified. It will be gradually replaced by a rational 
calculative analysis of competing value propositions 
(including the switching costs, envisioned reduction 
of future transaction costs, etc.). The yellow paper 
booklets will be the first-hand reference for this 
analysis, but there will also be competition between 
the many digital newcomers around the world.
The relational trust changes throughout the platform 
development as well. At the birth, it is based on the 
ecosystem members’ previous experiences with each 
other, or at least with the platform leader. When new 
experiences accumulate, e.g. during the piloting 
phase, the basis for trust becomes even more do-
main-specific, i.e. specific to this particular platform. 
The increase of the relational trust over time enables 
the platform to enter the self-renewal stage.
If a vaccination certificate platform succeeds in 
achieving leadership, then new questions related to 
the platform openness, possible new complements, 
and new areas of application will rise. The openness, 
which in the platform economy is predominantly 
seen as a positive feature, should not compromise 
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the existing platform members’ trust towards the 
leader and the whole ecosystem.
As for the majority in the society, building trust takes 
time, while the social influence from the pioneer us-
ers is also an important part of the trust emergence 
(Rogers, 2003). The pioneers in this case are the first 
countries joining the pilot project, but at the same 
time also the first organisations or individuals (opin-
ion leaders creating interpersonal trust). These pio-
neer countries are more likely the ones who recognise 
the existence of this kind of trust credit, or the ones 
who feel the most severe sense of urgency to have 
this kind of interoperable data platform in place.
Conclusions: The Role of Trust and 
Trust advantage in Gaining Sustained 
Competitive Advantage
The rise of the platform economy has brought to the 
spotlight competition between digital platforms, 
more recently also in the health sector. The trust-
intensive nature of health data is likely the reason 
why the multisided platforms have not been diffus-
ing in the healthcare systems as quickly as in other 
sectors, but it is about to change. As an antecedent 
of long-term cooperation (McEvily et al., 2003), com-
petitive advantage resulting from being trustworthy 
– the trust advantage – deserves further attention in 
analysing its potential diffusion paths.
The logic behind the platform business models 
challenges our understanding of the competition-
cooperation nexus, prioritising between quality and 
quantity, as well as achieving and sustaining com-
petitive advantage. In the platform economy, in the 
case of the first entrants to a market, a superior 
platform quality might be a way to outweigh a small-
er ecosystem and weaker network effects (McIntyre 
and Srinivasan, 2017), as a high-quality platform can 
later be scaled up, not vice versa. The “quality” here 
is a combination of the platform leader’s ability and 
willingness to orchestrate the platform setup and 
operations so that it would maximise mutually cre-
ated value, and trust can also be considered a reflec-
tion of the abovementioned platform quality.
Trust is an intangible asset that has been often ne-
glected or included in the broader term of a firm’s 
reputation. Trust is likely one of the imperfectly imi-
table (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982) resources, in that a 
firm that does not possess it cannot obtain it (easily 
and quickly). The trust advantage is a socially complex 
(Wilkins, 1989) firm resource, which is extremely hard 
to copy, i.e. if the platform leader itself does not slip, 
then it can be a cornerstone of the sustained compet-
itive advantage. Taken together, trust as a resource 
and the capability to gain and sustain trust, form the 
core of the competitive advantage for the platforms.
This article used the digital vaccination certificate 
platform as an example of a nascent platform, while 
announcements of several similar initiatives have been 
made around the world. Based on the rationale of a 
free market economy, the best price/value ratio from 
the end user’s perspective emerges in a competitive 
market situation, while for the society as a whole the 
competition is perceived as a positive force. Howev-
er, for simplifying global travel it would be logical that 
eventually one dominant standard would emerge. So, 
does this digital vaccination certificate platform offer a 
service where we can see (or would like to see) ongoing 
competition in the future, or is its perfect implemen-
tation possible only when there is one common global 
standard? Could the monopolistic status be a threat or 
would it be beneficial to the society as a whole?
First, it depends on how much, if any, power it has 
over the ecosystem members’ national vaccination 
registries, or whether it is just an intergovernmental 
data communication platform. The yellow cardboard 
vaccination certificates have a common standard 
also today, but it is hard to see a business opportu-
nity in it, rather they are a public good. However, if 
we look at the digital vaccination platform as a new 
data governance standard for e-health, or e-govern-
ance more broadly – as an attractive marketplace for 
providers of complementary goods and services, or 
as a hybrid platform encompassing also co-creation 
(Cusumano, Gawer, and Yoffie, 2019), the competi-
tion question becomes more relevant.
If a group of motivated participants in a business sec-
tor, covering the main ecosystem functions, already 
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successfully launches a DLT-based multisided plat-
form that is able to provide increasing marginal util-
ity through network effects, it will be very difficult to 
beat it with a traditional business model. The nature 
of network effects, which were discussed before, al-
lows only a few dominant marketplaces (Gassmann, 
Schmück, and Gilgen, 2019), and the initial com-
petitive advantage in this case could come from a 
first-mover advantage (Liebermann and Montgom-
ery, 1988), assuming that the first-mover could get 
a lead with creating the network effects. The more 
countries that join the first platform, the higher the 
entry barriers (Bain, 1956) to followers will be, as it 
becomes harder to provide equal value compared to 
the first-comer, and hence harder also to attract a 
critical mass of users.
The trust develops over time, and its nature and 
influence mechanisms change. At the launch, the 
trust towards the digital vaccination certificate plat-
form depends on the visionary countries, ICT firms 
and the individuals representing them. The objects 
of trust are the previous domain-specific experi-
ences and references, which enable the trust credit. 
Another potential source of trust credit is the care-
fully chosen strategic partnerships, the WHO in this 
particular case.
Successful piloting further strengthens the trust, and 
it is crucial for creating stronger network effects and 
scaling up. Thereon, in the stabilisation stage, estab-
lished trust motivates the countries and individuals to 
remain using the platform, and even apply it beyond 
international travel. The process is also well aligned 
with the ecosystem development model phases (birth, 
expansion, leadership, self-renewal) of Moore (1993), 
and it is useful in explaining how the trust evolves, and 
over time changes in its scope and degree.
In the course of the scaling up of the platform, the 
bottom line of the potential gains and losses be-
comes the focal point, i.e. the calculative trust in the 
platform’s viability becomes central. In the stabilisa-
tion stage, the trust becomes dependent on the ex-
periences in participating in the platform operations 
(e.g. success of the piloting period), and the platform 
leader’s capability to orchestrate it – preventing, de-
tecting and correcting faults, if necessary.
The global spread of Covid-19 has given the opportu-
nity to harness the momentum of setting up a digital 
vaccination certificate platform, but it remains rele-
vant far beyond Covid-19 – for travelling to countries 
where diseases like hepatitis, yellow fever, tubercu-
losis, rabies, etc. can still be found.
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